Stackelberg Surveillance

Authors

  • Bikramjit Banerjee The University of Southern Mississippi School of Computing 118 College Dr. #5106 Hattiesburg, MS 39406, U.S.A
  • Landon Kraemer The University of Southern Mississippi School of Computing 118 College Dr. #5106 Hattiesburg, MS 39406, U.S.A

Abstract

Bayesian Stackelberg game theory has recently been applied for security-resource allocation at ports and airports, transportation, shipping and infrastructure, modeled as security games. We model the interactions in a camera surveillance problem as a security game, and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium of this game can be formulated as the solution to a non-linear program (NLP). We provide two approximate solutions to this formulation: (a) a linear approximation based on an existing approach (called ASAP), and (b) a hill-climbing based policy search approximation. The rst reduces the problem to a single (but dicult) linear program, while the second reduces it to a set of (easier) linear programs. We consider two variants of the problem: one where the camera is visible, and another where it is contained in a tinted enclosure. We show experimental results comparing our approaches to standard NLP solvers.

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Published

2015-12-22

How to Cite

Banerjee, B., & Kraemer, L. (2015). Stackelberg Surveillance. Informatica, 39(4). Retrieved from https://puffbird.ijs.si/index.php/informatica/article/view/1084

Issue

Section

Regular papers